Response 4/20

As others have pointed out, the Ereshefsky article brings up an issue that has been discussed frequently in class--namely, whether we can objectively claim that humans are in someway separate from nature; that our actions (some of them at least) can be considered unnatural. Ereshefsky uncovers the fallacies of this way of thinking, and goes on to discuss the effects that they have on environmental preservation. He claims that the attempt to differentiate between humans and nature is in the end only a pointless distraction from the goals of conservation, and concludes by saying that we should instead determine what parts of the environment we want to save based on other criteria, and then get on it without wasting time pondering useless philosophical questions.
This logic seemed contradictory to me. I agree with the fact that we cannot say that humans and nature are wholly separate entities--although we do have certain differences from other animals--and I agree that this difference should not be the grounds for considering which animals to save etc. However, applying this type of deconstructive ontology to Ereshefsky's conclusion is problematic: how should we go about deciding what aspects of the environment are worth saving?